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Deep tensions between people living in Israel and in the 
Occupied territories have led to one of the most enduring 
conflicts of modern times. Despite numerous attempts, conflict 
resolution has generally failed in the Israeli-Palestinian case. 
One underexplored reason for the repeated failure to achieve 
resolution is that underlying social forces perpetuate the cycle 
of conflict between Israel and Palestine. 
Following the 1995 Oslo Peace Accords, Israel’s road 
construction to access settlements and formation of blockades 
and check-points in response to violence during the first 
intifada isolated Palestinian communities and exacerbated 
tensions (for example, Glenn and Gordon 2003, 2005). While 
these actions were necessary for Israeli security, they stifled 
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economic activity in Gaza and the West Bank, leading to 
difficult economic conditions within the Occupied territories 
(Farsoun and Aruri 2005).  
While Israel’s settlement-building and Palestinian militants’ 
violent responses are considered two (of many) causes for 
ongoing tensions, the persistence of the dispute is also related 
to the rather neglected social context (for example Cleveland 
2004; Shlaim 2009). Social factors may be pertinent to 
attempts at peace-building because the dispute is heavily 
politicized. Politically inspired attempts at resolution often fail 
in part because conflict is simplified into lists of demands and 
implicit casual “if – then” statements through negotiations. As 
Coleman articulates, “linear political thinking is associated 
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The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains one of the most deeply entrenched in the world. While there is great knowledge about numerous 
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with a simple, dualistic view of conflict situations and with a 
more competitive and destructive orientation” (2011, 65). The 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is more complex than the sum of its 
parts. Giving up territory, legitimizing the opponent, or ending 
retaliatory attacks will not resolve this conflict. Instead of 
engaging the overt matters of conflict, progress toward peace 
may be made by addressing underlying social issues.  
There is a host of support for the idea that indirect 
approaches addressing social problems may aid conflict 
resolution. For instance, the emergence of peace following 
Mozambique’s civil war came partially from social – rather than 
political – efforts. As Bartoli, Bui-Wrzosinska, and Nowak 
(2010) elaborate, the Mozambique civil war eventually 
enveloped nearly all daily life within the country. As the conflict 
spread, people were drawn into it as factions solidified power 
and took control of or eliminated social institutions. According 
to Bartoli and colleagues, the Mozambique civil war thus 
became “frozen” as a bitter stalemate. Resolution began when 
various catalysts helped cultivate new communication 
channels between the factions. Bartoli, Bui-Wrzosinska, and 
Nowak (ibid.) suggest Bishop Gonçalves was one such 
catalyst, as his personal background facilitated his acceptance 
across the groups, which afforded him the opportunity to 
initiate intergroup communication as a neutral intermediary. 
Importantly, Gonçalves was not viewed as possessing 
legitimization from powers external to the conflict. While the 
circumstances surrounding the resolution of Mozambique civil 
war are complex, an insider’s role in providing new avenues of 
communication between groups that otherwise interacted only 
with suspicion and hostility provides a strong example of what 
Coleman (2011) terms “weak power.” Weak power attempts 
to help resolve conflict by indirect, and often local, 
engagement. Weak power is advantageous because it permits 
a bottom-up source of positive change where people 
experiencing a conflict are stakeholders in the pathway to 
peace, rather than remaining spectators to outcomes emerging 
from more forceful, externally controlled peace initiatives (such 
as those brokered by political powers or intervening third 
parties). A weak power approach also avoids the tendency for 
people to resist change concerning core conflict issues. 
Instead, weak power operates on the conflict’s peripheries, 
nudging those involved into new ways of thinking and behaving 
(ibid.), which facilitates new potential for situational change. 
There are many social and psychological factors that 
promote resistance to change in conflict situations, including 
how religious, educational, and media institutions contribute 
to a conflict’s persistence (Deutsch 1994). In addition, 
psychological factors, including cognitions, feelings, emotions, 
power asymmetries, and strong reactivity to negative 
information, play significant roles in conflict (Molm, Collett, 
and Schaefer 2006; Michaels, Vallacher, and Liebovitch 2013; 
Nair 2008; Pruitt and Olczak 1995). Finally, even broader 
factors wielding influence in conflicts include culture and 
cultural norms, ethnic salience, and group identification (Auger 
et al. 2010; Bhavnani and Miadownik 2009; Jabs 2007; 
Kozan 1997; Rouhanna and Korper 1997). Rather than 
reviewing the details of all factors (see Blumberg, Hare, and 
Costin 2006, for a review), it is beneficial to examine them 
from a broader perspective that provides insights into how they 
combine to sustain a conflict and how circumventing these 
factors can potentially provide a “path of least resistance” 
toward peace. 
 
1. A Complex, Dynamic Perspective on Conflict  
Complexity science and dynamic systems theory provide 
insights into how the various factors affect conflict 
development, progression, and change over time. Emergence 
is one concept that is insightful; emergence is the tendency for 
disorganized behaviors and interactions to organize into 
coherent patterns. Emergence is closely related to a second 
concept from complexity science:  self-organization, in the 
sense of a process by which bottom-up actions by individuals 
give rise to organized larger-scale social action (Coleman 
2011; Nowak and Vallacher 1998). Self-organization 
promotes coherence within social systems. Emergent social 
coherence can lead to a shared sense of identity, common 
norms, and shared morals, all of which are necessary for a 
functional society. However, coherence can also contribute to 
problems, including conflict when people embrace rigid, 
stereotypical attitudes about members of an outgroup that 
tend to exacerbate tensions. The sense of rigid coherence 
giving rise to a worsening conflict is a key idea that can be 
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understood from a third complexity science concept, the 
attractor. 
An attractor is any coherent, consistent, persistent, and 
stable state within a system (cf. Coleman 2011; Liebovitch, 
Vallacher, & Michaels 2010; Nowak and Vallacher 1998; 
Strogatz 1994). An attractor’s stabilizing force tends to be 
restrictive, keeping a given system in a particular state over a 
long period of time. Applied to social systems, attractors 
include characteristic ways that people behave, coordinate, 
and interact. The attractor is a fundamental concept in 
dynamic-systems-inspired approaches to understanding the 
process at work across different levels of conflict. In benign 
conflicts, such as commonplace arguments and 
disagreements, conflict has not emerged as a coherent and 
defining pattern. The adversaries in a benign dispute may feel 
agitated and argue vigorously, but they tend to “cool off” and 
can later approach one another with new ways to settle 
differences. However, if the negative exchanges and 
consequences go unresolved or if the adversaries escalate the 
dispute, the underlying dynamic may change. Over time, 
persistent conflict primes adversaries to think and feel more 
negatively about one another. Seething emotions and 
malignant thoughts press those involved to act in hurtful ways 
toward one another. Such intensifying negativity can draw 
bystanders into the dispute. Friends of the adversaries are 
drawn into choosing sides, or if they try to remain neutral, may 
be accused of supporting the opponent. This familiar pattern 
of escalation reflects the emergence of a powerful, coherent, 
and self-organizing pattern of conflict (cf. Coleman et al. 2007; 
Vallacher et al. 2010). As the conflict between individuals or 
groups intensifies, the levels of psychological and social reality 
– including thoughts, feelings, actions, and social relations – 
become increasingly interlinked as an attractor emerges.  
Interlinking refers to “conflict initiated at an intergroup level 
(…) likely to spawn and reinforce the [negative] beliefs, 
emotions, and actions of individuals in their interpersonal 
relations” (Coleman et al. 2007, 1465). Kriesberg (1980) 
defines an interlinking conflict as one with connected and 
embedded events pertaining to an enduring, malignant 
relation between adversaries. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
interlinked, multidimensional, and complex with internal 
factors including leadership competition, economic 
development, and ideological changes all contributing to the 
“multidimensional ethnonational conflict” (Reiter 2009, xvi). 
Each of these factors is connected in some way to the conflict, 
contributing to an enduring pattern of conflict. Through 
interlinking, this “conflict attractor” influences many 
components of life in Israel and in the occupied territories, 
making the conflict a defining part of life. Is there any hope to 
escape this powerful dynamic? 
According to the dynamic systems approach, peace may be 
more likely to emerge through taking initiatives to resolve 
social issues rather than by focusing on externally brokered 
peace agreements and politically directed negotiations. 
Addressing social problems through a combination of 
grassroots problem-solving efforts, improved social 
connections, and enhanced social capital, may allow the 
emergence of enclaves ripe for peace where people can arrive 
at new ways of acting, thinking, and feeling (cf. Coleman 
2011). Over time, locally positive social relations can foster 
potential for peace. The core idea of this approach is that 
resolving intractable conflict first requires a secure social 
foundation capable of supporting peace.  
 
2. Some Fundamental Social Factors Contributing to 
Conflict 
Establishment of a social foundation conducive to peace 
between Israel and Gaza/The West Bank first requires an 
understanding of the complex social factors contributing to 
sustaining the conflict. These social factors persist beneath the 
more salient reasons for the dispute (such as historical 
tensions and land rights), and include problems with the 
Palestinian leadership (worsened in part by Israeli 
intervention), economic inequalities between Israel and 
Palestine, depleted social services within the occupied 
territories, geographic constraints that create dense urban 
clusters prone to social volatility, and psychological factors 
exacerbating rigid, inflexible patterns of interaction in both the 
Israeli and Palestinian contexts. 
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2.1. Leadership and Instability 
The process for ending these violent cycles is 
multidimensional, but the lack of leadership in the occupied 
territories remains a critical and specific problem (Issa 2010). 
Without well-organized leadership in the territories, political 
instability is rampant (Nachmias 1999), contributing to the 
success of militant groups that thrive on the political instability. 
As Abu-Amr explains: “Hamas emerged in a context of 
disillusionment with the Palestinian secular political 
movements and with the frustrated hope of achieving salvation 
from the Israeli occupation through them” (Abu-Amr 1994, 
66). Israel’s involvement in Palestinian affairs had further 
unintended consequences leading to the rise of Hamas. For 
example, Israel initially showed some support for Mujama Al-
Islamiya, an Islamic Center that included a mosque with social 
support units including a clinic and women’s center. In the run-
up to the intifada, Mujama Al-Islamiya became increasingly 
important within the occupied territories as Israeli-run 
structures of authority (such as the courts) shut down. The 
informal channeling of power to Mujama Al-Islamiya coincided 
with its founder, Sheik Ahmad Yasin, and others founding 
Hamas as a resistance movement in 1987 (ibid.). Hamas 
accordingly occupies a complex place within Palestinian 
society and in the broader context of tensions between Israel 
and the Gaza Strip/West Bank. While Hamas seeks Palestinian 
independence establishment of a truly Islamic society within 
Gaza and the West Bank and resistance to Israel, especially 
with respect to lands lost during the 1948 and 1967 wars 
(Shadid 1988), it also is linked to social services within the 
Occupied territories. Thus, Hamas is integrated within 
Palestinian life, providing essential social and educational 
services, which further permits this group to indirectly influence 
people’s perspectives of the conflict in the Gaza Strip and in 
the West Bank. Thus, understanding the dynamical interplay 
between economic inequalities between Israel and Palestine, 
poverty, and education can help to potentially generate new 
pathways for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 
2.2. Stratification and Poverty 
There are stark contrasts between the standards of living 
enjoyed by people who live in Israel versus those in the Gaza 
Strip or West Bank. Whereas Israel is prosperous, the occupied 
territories suffer from significant unemployment and economic 
hardship (Nachtwey and Tessler 1995). In 1993, the U.N.’s 
annual report indicated 30 to 40 percent unemployment in 
Gaza and the West Bank (UNWRA 2009a); conditions have not 
improved since the early 1990s, especially in Gaza. In 2008, 
48.3 percent of Palestinians living in Gaza were unemployed, 
whereas 26.0 percent of Palestinians living in the West Bank 
were unemployed (ibid.). Economic conditions are stagnant in 
the West Bank and “particularly dire” in Gaza, such that the 
economic conditions are among the worst in the Middle East 
and North Africa (UNWRA 2009b). Israel has lower 
unemployment and the highest GDP in the Middle East (UN 
2009). The economic hardships in the occupied territories 
juxtaposed against prosperous Israel make the economic 
inequalities between Israel and Gaza/the West Bank especially 
salient, contributing to tensions arising from a myriad of social 
forces. For example, studies provide consistent evidence that 
in situations with two distinct groups, the lower status group 
tends to form stronger ingroup bias (see Tajfel 1982 for a 
review), which changes group dynamics in powerful ways 
including increased emphasis on ingroup similarities and 
outgroup differences (for example Tajfel 1969). As Brewer 
explains, a sense of “moral superiority, distrust of outgroups, 
and social comparison all emerge from ingroup maintenance 
and favoritism and can lead to hostility and conflict between 
groups even in the absence of realistic conflict over material 
resources or power” (2007, 703). Combined with memory of 
the intractable conflict, economic stratification strengthens 
ingroup-outgroup identities and is one social force factoring 
into the conflict.   
The poor economic conditions in the Occupied territories 
further exacerbate Israeli-Palestinian tensions and contribute 
to aggressive attitudes within the territories (Shlaim 2009). It 
is well-known that there are correlations between poverty and 
violence (for example Foster, Brooks-Gunn, and Martin 2007). 
Individuals who join violent groups are often unemployed and 
marginalized but retain strong social bonds within their 
communities (Strom and Irvin 2007). In the Israel-Palestine 
context, associations between violence and poverty are 
amplified by political violence as evident by clear relationships 
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between Palestinian youths’ socio-economic status and 
exposure to political, domestic, and social violence (Al-
Krenawi, Graham, and Sehwail 2007).  
In many cases, violence originating in Gaza or the West Bank 
is directed towards Israel, which is seen as an exploitive, 
outgroup entity. One political example of exploitation comes 
from the Paris Accords, which allow Israeli products entry into 
Palestinian territories while restricting Palestinian exports 
(Farsoun and Aruri 2005). Palestinians’ perception of Israeli 
exploitation goes beyond political discourse, however. As one 
sixteen-year-old Palestinian girl related: “Every day I wake up, 
I realize once again that we are still enslaved by cruel powers 
[Israel]” (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2009, 336). Furthermore, while 
Israel needs strict border enforcement for security, this 
heightens Palestinians’ sense of exploitation (Borstein 2002). 
Empirical evidence of the relationship between Palestinians’ 
economic trouble and violent acts against Israel comes from 
Sayre’s (2009) observation that bombings carried out by 
Palestinian militant groups increased when economic 
conditions deteriorated in the Occupied territories. Sayre 
(2009, 23) concludes that one of the most important elements 
of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict may be the 
frustration shared by Palestinian youth who “unlike their 
parents, have been promised peace and prosperity by the Oslo 
Accords, and when these benefits failed to appear, their 
frustration soared.” This conclusion is supported by other 
studies that link violent group membership with poverty and 
unemployment (see Strom and Irving 2007). In the Palestinian 
context, however, there is an additional factor contributing to 
the conflict: the complex interaction between organizations 
concerned with social welfare, fundamentalism, and 
resistance. 
 
2.3. Link between Poverty and Support for Extremism 
A difficult economy and ongoing political tensions between 
Israel and the occupied territories contribute to social 
frustrations within Gaza and the West Bank. This frustration 
benefits the militant groups that are active within the occupied 
territories. As Lederman summarizes: “when governments 
cannot provide essential services, radical groups can move 
into niche areas such as health services and education at 
relatively low cost, and that in turn has a direct impact on mass 
perceptions” (1995, 565). One outcome from continued social 
and economic frustrations may be the resurgence of Islamic 
fundamentalism in recent decades, which attracts 
disenfranchised youth who are most often exposed to the daily 
life difficulties these problems exacerbate (see Abu-Amr 1994; 
Nachtwey and Tessler 1995). 
Severe deficiencies in the secular Palestinian Authority’s 
capacity to provide social services for its population plays 
favorably into Islamic fundamentalist groups’ social power. 
This is especially evident with the Islamic Brotherhood in the 
Palestinian Territories, from which Hamas formed in response 
to the intifada (Abu-Amr 1994). The Islamic Brotherhood has 
a long history of running religious schools, kindergartens and 
nursery schools, libraries, sports clubs, women’s centers, and 
even informal courts (ibid.). The Islamic Brotherhood also 
provides social and economic support to Palestinian victims of 
political violence (Abbott 2010). Its multifaceted role in 
Palestinian life garners support as the legitimate resistance to 
Israeli occupation. Comparatively, the Palestinian Authority is 
viewed less favorably and is considered an inept leadership 
(Farsoun and Aruri 2005). With support for the Islamic 
Brotherhood and stark differences between Israeli and 
Palestinian standards of living, associated fundamentalist 
groups in the Occupied territories capitalize on the economic 
situation. These groups gain support within Gaza and the West 
Bank, especially amongst students. 
 
2.4. Students and Education 
Under the Israeli occupation, Palestinian schools were often 
controlled by the Israeli government, poorly funded, and used 
a curriculum lacking cultural relevance to the Arab population 
within Gaza and the West Bank. Accordingly, these schools 
often became zones of confrontation with educators not 
necessarily adhering to the formal curriculum. Meanwhile, 
negative portrayals of the opposing side surfacing in both the 
Palestinian and Israeli primary schools sensitize children to the 
precarious socio-political situation existing between Israel and 
the Palestinian Territories (Abu-Saad and Champagne 2006).  
The daily reality of living with the intractable conflict leads to 
children experiencing anxiety and other psychological distress 
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which may enhance the vulnerability to influence of 
adolescents and young adults (for example Abdeen et al., 
2008). This is evident within Palestinian universities, where 
Hamas and other groups benefit from students’ frustration 
about Israel and difficult economic conditions. Militant groups 
attempt to influence such institutions so that they are “centers 
of political struggle and national resistance” that empower the 
Palestinian people (Abu-Saad and Champagne 2006, 1044; 
Bruhn 2006; Parsons 2005). The Israeli military and 
government is well-aware that these institutions are central to 
Palestinian resistance, but repressive measures taken toward 
the universities (Abu-Saad and Champagne 2006) only 
exacerbate hostile perspectives toward Israel. 
Within the Occupied territories, the difficult economic 
situation provides limited opportunities for educated 
Palestinians (Farsoun and Aruri 2005). Therefore, Palestinian 
students graduating from the universities in the Occupied 
territories are likely to be unemployed and marginalized, 
factors that are precursors to potentially violent behavior 
(Strom and Irving 2007). With limited opportunities for 
university graduates in the Occupied territories, students may 
look to the Islamic Brotherhood for social validation and 
support (cf. Abu-Amr 1994). As is evident from this brief 
analysis, the education system in the Occupied territories faces 
an array of problems that combine to generate a persistent 
cycle of anger and frustration among students. Over time, and 
when they experience other consequences of the ongoing 
dispute, Palestinian youth internalize this hostility and 
negativity, allowing the conflict attractor to cycle through 
another generation. 
 
2.5. Clusters of Poverty and Hostility 
Israeli Defense Force ground and air strikes on the occupied 
territory escalated in late 2008 in what became known as the 
Gaza War. Conversely, militant groups persisted in rocket and 
mortar attacks on Israel (Ministry of Foreign Affairs – The State 
of Israel 2009). During the Gaza War there was relatively little 
violence within territory in Israel and in the West Bank, which 
some might attribute to the success of Israeli-controlled 
borders and defensive walls. There is likely, however, a deeper 
social dimension to the recent distribution of violence, linked 
to ideas from complexity science. The geospatial territory 
occupied by different groups of people may alter behavior and 
group stability, an idea captured by clustering of similar 
groups. 
Clustering is a well-known phenomenon in social network 
models (Nowak and Vallacher 1998). A core assumption in 
social network clustering is that groups try to achieve 
homogeneous neighborhoods within an initially heterogeneous 
mixture of groups. Clustering patterns are evident in the more 
extensive West Bank and in the densely populated Gaza Strip. 
Lim, Metzler, and Bar-Yam (2007) found that separation 
between homogeneous population clusters may critically 
influence the evolution of intergroup conflict. When distinct 
groups are separated by less than 10 kilometers, significant 
intergroup contact may disrupt the clustering phenomenon and 
limit potential for the minority group to evolve a strong ingroup 
identity while separation of more than 100 kilometers tends to 
isolate the groups, lending to less immediate contact that 
reduces the chance of conflict. Simulations conducted by Lim, 
Metzler, and Bar-Yam (2007) found that when distinct groups 
exhibit strong clustering around incongruent identities, such as 
religious belief or historic identity, and have group separation 
between 10 and 100 kilometers, there is greater chance that 
the relative proximity heightens risk of conflict. Based on the 
simulations, geographic factors and population clustering may 
influence persistent tensions between Israel and Palestine 
considering that major population centers in the Gaza Strip, 
such as Gaza City, and West Bank, such as Ramallah, are 
within the 10 to 100 kilometer distance from Israeli controlled 
border crossings. 
This assessment fits with Schelling’s model that 
demonstrates that larger, more distinct clusters emerge when 
two groups are less tolerant of one another (Gallegati and 
Richiardi 2009). The historic tensions within Israel and 
Palesitne coupled with the polarized groups that have strong 
yet distinct social identities are contrasting factors that can 
yield a social situation that is especially prone to conflict 
(Bhavnani and Miadownik 2009). In addition to clustering’s 
role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, economic inequality and 
poverty in Gaza may combine to make this territory’s border a 
particularly volatile place. 
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2.6 Religion, Politics, and Social Factors 
Particularly salient social and psychological differences in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict relate to distinct religious 
differences and the trend toward more extreme, conservative, 
and nationalist political viewpoints that appeal to more 
fundamentalist religious beliefs. The relationship between 
Palestinian political leaders, the military wing of Hamas, 
social-welfare organizations, and the Islamic faith is complex 
and multilayered. The same is true within Israel. While is easy 
to scapegoat fundamentalism or Zionism as factors 
exacerbating Israeli-Palestinian tensions, the reality is that the 
majority of Israeli citizens and political processes are secular 
(for example, Beit-Hallahmi 1993). However, right-wing 
politicians appealing to a more conservative base adopt 
messages from faith and Zionism to advocate for land rights 
and a slower peace process (for example, for Israeli politics 
after Oslo, see Cleveland 2004). Unfortunately, this approach 
contributes to a mentality simplifying the conflict into an “us 
versus them” framework linked to a “right versus wrong” value 
system. 
While there are numerous excellent examinations of how 
religion and Zionism play into this particular context (for 
example Beit-Hallahmi 1993; Cleveland 2004; Morris 2007), 
it may be insightful to draw upon ideas from psychology to 
better understand how these factors (and Israeli politics) 
contribute to a volatile conflict resistant to change. In the 
psychology of religion, recent research has identified that more 
negative, antagonistic relations often emerge between groups 
when group members adhere to a combination of religious 
fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism. Religious 
fundamentalism is the belief in a single true religion; right-wing 
authoritarianism is a belief in strict adherence to social 
convention and obedience to legitimatized leaders. Owing in 
part to their more absolute beliefs, people who adhere to 
religious fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism are 
more likely to derogate those who do not share their views and 
are more likely to behave aggressively, including supporting 
military aggression (for reviews see Johnson, Rowatt, and 
LaBouff 2011; Vincent, Parrott, and Peterson 2011; McFarland 
2005; Rowatt et al. 2013). If military aggression is legitimized 
around religious values, the resultant conflict can be 
particularly resilient as such beliefs promote totalizing goals; 
thus, outcomes are seen increasingly in “all or nothing” terms 
with little chance of a conciliatory approach (cf. Strom and 
Irving 2007). In a psychological sense, these rigid belief and 
value systems are hallmarks of a strong need for cognitive 
closure – a way of thinking that entails rigidly favoring one’s 
own views while dismissing those of others, leading to 
intolerance for ambiguity when it comes to important issues 
such as moral justification (Webster and Kruglanski 1994). 
Psychological factors including religious fundamentalism, 
right-wing authoritarianism, and need for closure doubtlessly 
play a role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While it would be 
too simple to presume the majority of people who live in Israel, 
the Gaza Strip, or the West Bank are swayed by these precise 
processes, there is little doubt that the vocal majorities that 
argue for a total victory in securing land rights based on history, 
ancestry, or religious belief tap into these powerful forces. 
Thus, psychological forces permeate the Israel-Palestine 
conflict and contribute to tensions that make reconciliation 
less probable. 
 
3. Mapping the Social Factors that Stabilize Conflict 
From a dynamic systems perspective, social elements are 
entrenched in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and coalesce with 
overt disputes to rigidly maintain the conflict status-quo. The 
previous section outlined six social factors that contribute to 
tensions between Israeli and Palestine: 1) lack of effective 
leadership within the occupied territories; 2) economic 
stratification and poverty; 3) support for groups linked to 
extreme factions as a consequence of poor social resources; 
4) lack of opportunities for young Palestinians; 5) dense 
clusters of poverty; and 6) psycho-social factors that mutually 
influence, and are influenced by, politics and religion in the 
region. Mapping these factors in relation to one another and 
to larger issues may provide insight into the system dynamics, 
which are pertinent for finding new directions for peace 
building. 
Examining system dynamics to understand relationships is 
at the core of systemic thinking, which “seeks meaning in the 
complex patterning of interrelationships between people and 
groups of people” (Burns 2007, 21). Examining how various 
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factors in a social system interrelate makes nonobvious 
dynamics increasingly apparent. It is critical to assess such 
dynamics, as any outcome, including peace, rarely results from 
a one-step process (Burns 2007). Systemic mapping provides 
a tool for examining unanticipated relationships in a complex 
social situation and is itself a dynamic, iterative process (cf. 
Ricigliano 2012). Accordingly, the following maps are 
preliminary and are brief examples of how specific factors 
present in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may be mapped. In 
practice, such mapping should be undertaken in dialogue with 
actual stakeholders who know the conflict on different levels 
(see Burns 2007; Ricigliano, 2012). 
I began my example mapping by relating the macro factors 
that are acknowledged in many traditional accounts of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Figure 1). These include Israeli and 
Palestinian concerns with territory and land rights, Israel’s 
need for security, and both sides’ sense of displacement (for 
example “right of return” and land confiscation) leading to 
desire for retaliation (Cleveland 2004; Glenn and Gordon 
2003; Shlaim 2009). 
As Ricigliano (2012) notes, there is “no one clear place to 
begin” when it comes to systems mapping (116). The 
previously listed factors are often identified as core issues in 
the conflict (for example Coleman 2011), thus serving a useful 
starting point. The map reveals the rich dynamics between 
macro-level factors. For example, Israel’s attempt to tighten 
security with checkpoints makes settlement construction and 
land confiscation more salient for Palestinians, leading to 
frustration culminating in aggression on various levels (such as 
riots, extremist groups launching attacks), which is detrimental 
to Israeli security. This dynamic is evident in Figure 1 as a 
series of excitatory relationships (denoted with arrows) where 
Israel’s desire for security promotes use of check-points, 
bolstering Palestinian frustration. This frustration contributes to 
violence against Israel, which reduces Israel’s sense of security 
(denoted by a dashed line with a cross). Dynamics that 
influence Israel are shown with dashed lines in the figure, while 
dynamics influencing Palestine are presented as solid lines. 
Figure 1 provides limited new insights into the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and forms a foundation for exploring how 
important deeper social elements interact. 
After the preliminary mapping, I attempted to link smaller-
scale social factors to the larger-scale issues and to one-
another, and to include a primary psychological factor (see 
Figure 2). For example, Israel’s sense of security, bolstered by 
check-points and other unmapped factors (such as missile 
Figure 1: Preliminary map of some core macro-level factors contributing to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
 
IJCV: Vol. 11#04/2017 
Michaels: Social Forces Sustaining the Israeli-Palestinian Tensions: A Dynamical Psychology Perspective 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
defense) also contribute to the nation’s economic success 
relative to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This in turn 
enhances Israeli security while alienating Palestinians who 
perceive severe economic hardship and inequality. The 
dynamic link between Israeli security and economic success is 
shown by a dashed line (designating a primarily Israeli 
concern) ending in arrows on either end (designating excitatory 
factors). The dynamic interaction between Israeli’s economic 
success and Palestinians’ sense of economic difficulty is 
shown by a solid black line (designating the dynamic as a 
primarily Palestinian concern) ending in an arrow. Many of the 
factors related to support for more extreme views and need for 
within-group security are strengthened by the underlying right-
wing authoritarianism values. 
The expanded system map (see Figure 2) provides a 
foundation for considering the complexity inherent in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a systemic perspective. It is 
evident from the map that multiple connections exist between 
factors that promote negative interactions and combine into 
antagonistic feedback loops between the involved parties, with 
these feedback loops serving to sustain the conflict (cf. 
Coleman 2011). 
 
Figure 2: Expanded map of the macro-level and social factors present in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
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4. Circumventing Entrenched Feedback Loops via Weak 
Power 
The feedback loops underlying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
enhance its persistence. Figure 2, coupled with ideas from 
complexity science, provides insights into how indirect 
approaches may circumvent the interacting factors that sustain 
the conflict as a normative pattern. Over time, indirect 
approaches can gradually alter the feedback loops to generate 
new potentials for peace arising from small-scale patterns of 
positive social relations between adversaries. In time, positive 
exchanges may intensify and become commonplace leading 
to new latent attractors for peace, eventually supplanting the 
attractors that constrained the system in a conflict pattern (for 
example Coleman 2011; Liebovitch et al. 2010, Vallacher et 
al. 2010). As with any complex system, a new pattern, such 
as a latent attractor for peace, is unlikely to yield purely 
predictable outcomes, and peace may fail to take hold. 
Nevertheless, as Nowak and Vallacher (2000) demonstrate 
with computer simulations, in a space with complex 
connections between people, positive social change 
developing in a system riddled by conflict can yield local 
bubbles harboring new ways of thinking and acting. Once 
rooted, these positive behaviors can spread, leading to 
potential for emergent peace that is the critical factor for 
escaping an intractable conflict. 
The idea that local peace initiatives can yield larger influence 
is not confined to theory. For example, social entrepreneurs are 
individuals who “produce small changes in the short term” that 
eventually elicit “significant change in the longer term” 
(Praszkier and Nowak 2012, 10–11). Typically, social 
entrepreneurs engage in small-scale initiatives that seek 
changes within a local community rather than engaging a 
large-scale problem directly. This approach relies on what 
Coleman (2011) terms weak power: an indirect approach to 
problem solving that avoids direct engagement in the issues 
that lead to extremism and polarization. Weak power often 
relies on a bottom-up approach that permits greater 
emergence of new patterns of action within a system (cf. 
Coleman 2011; Praszkier and Nowak 2012). Unlike the top-
down approaches often applied to conflicts when external 
parties become involved in negotiation and peacemaking, the 
bottom-up process often used by social entrepreneurs allows 
local social organization to enhance social capital, the 
elements of social life that permit effective interactions 
between people and groups (cf. Praszkier and Nowak 2012). 
Within the Israeli-Palestinian context, there are social 
entrepreneurs whose efforts may provide starting points for 
cultivating peace. For example, Abdelfattah Abusrour has 
worked to provide Palestinian youth with centers devoted to 
promoting positive experiences, ways to resist Israeli 
occupation through non-violent means, and counseling and 
tutoring services (see Ashoka 2013a). Abusrour provides a 
clear example of the bottom-up, weak force approach 
advocated by the present analysis. Having grown-up in a 
refugee camp, Abusrour possesses firsthand experience with 
the human consequences of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On 
account of his background, Abusrour is capable of building 
rapport with Palestinian refugees (youth in particular) and 
draws upon his knowledge to facilitate proactive, small-scale 
social change. Abusrour worked to develop the Al Rowwad 
Community Center (ACC) in the Aida Refugee camp, a place 
ripe for volatility due, in part, to its location near an Israeli 
checkpoint. Through the ACC, Abusrour has created a safe 
haven for Palestinian youth to escape the social problems that 
plague their community, where they can instead express 
themselves, dream, and simply be children. 
Other social entrepreneurs are engaged in issues relating to 
violence, youth, and economic problems within the Palestinian 
Territories. Yehudah Paz’s efforts led to the Negev Institute for 
Strategies of Peace and Development (NIPSED), an 
organization that provides training and organization for 
peacemakers and the development of small scale economic 
and social projects that help transform local communities 
(Ashoka 2013b). Recognizing that a top-down approach to 
social problems does not foster transformation, Paz and the 
NIPSED cultivate grassroots efforts to provide positive change 
and improve Israeli-Palestinian relations. For example, in 2009 
Paz’s International Center for the Promotion of Small and 
Medium Enterprises brought Israeli and Palestinian women 
artisans and entrepreneurs together in Beersheva, Israel, and 
Beit Jalah, West Bank (ibid.) so that they could collaborate. 
This project transcends the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to bring 
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together people who might not otherwise work together. 
Ultimately, the project serves to help the local artisans and 
entrepreneurs build social capital and enhance their 
communities’ economic potential. 
Abusrour and Paz are two exceptional individuals whose 
actions demonstrate that a weak power, peace writ small, 
approach to conflict may help to generate new ways for people 
to interact and frame their social relations. While such small-
scale initiatives are unlikely to lead to immediate cessation of 
hostilities, they can be an impetus for emergent peace (for the 
Mozambique case, see Bartoli et al. 2010). Social 
entrepreneurs work at the periphery of conflicts to generate 
enclaves in which new interactions distinct from the 
established antagonistic ways of thinking and behaving can 
emerge. Given time, emergent new behaviors can organize 
across a grassroots level and provide a critical foundation for 
peace. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The Israel-Palestine conflict has persisted for over a century 
– exacting immense costs through loss of life, psychological 
trauma, and economic turmoil (see Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2009; 
Sayre 2009; Al-Krenawi et al. 2007). One likely reason for the 
failure of previous initiatives is that they largely relied upon 
political or third-party mediation. There is more than politics or 
history at work in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Daily life in 
Gaza and the West Bank as well as in Israel has been 
frequently disrupted by the conflict. Even when there are no 
overt instances of violence, the conflict’s impacts linger. As the 
conflict has deepened and persisted, multiple elements of life 
have been affected and absorbed in the vicious conflict cycle. 
Therefore, successful conflict resolution in the Israel-Palestine 
context needs to address a broader array of elements including 
social factors. 
Several social problems exacerbate the Israeli-Palestinian 
tensions. These include wide disparities between the two 
regions, which are most salient in economic stability, 
opportunities for employment, and access to social resources 
(Faroun and Aruri 2005; Abbott 2010). The network of security 
wells and border crossings disrupt travel and communication 
and in-turn heighten the formation of population clusters 
where insular ideas can more readily spread (Borstein 2002; 
Lieberfeld 2007; Lim et al 2007). Clearly a program that 
addresses all the social problems in detail would be unwieldy, 
and people on both sides obviously have a right to security and 
economic well-being However, smaller initiatives with specific 
goals to address social problems could be implemented. Such 
programs may not quickly resolve the enduring Israel-Palestine 
conflict, but may “ripen” the situation so that resolution may 
take root (cf. Coleman 2000; Zartman 2000). Indeed, there is 
a complex and nested network of social forces influencing one 
another, as revealed by the systems maps. Unraveling the web 
of factors that contribute to a resistant conflict in Israel and the 
occupied territories is no easy task and necessitates starting 
at a small-scale social level. 
 This brief analysis identifies some key social problems that 
need to be addressed before peace can emerge within the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including: 1) enhancing 
opportunities for Palestinian youth expression, success, and 
achievement (such as Abusrour’s efforts); 2) initiating new 
social services which may reduce reliance on services 
presently provided by groups that have historical affiliations 
with militant organizations; 3) opening new lines of 
communication between the occupied territories, which may 
reduce the volatile group clustering observed in the Gaza Strip 
by better connecting this isolated territory with the larger West 
Bank; and 4) developing new lines of communication between 
the occupied territories and Israel, offering non-conflict-
oriented exchanges between the people living in these area, 
which may gradually lead to new understanding and spreading 
tolerance between the two groups (such as Paz’s efforts). While 
peace is unlikely to come from these ideas alone, working to 
promote small, socially focused changes can locally alter the 
persistent negativity, antagonism, and pessimism that 
contribute to a social atmosphere unready for peace or 
change. In order for Israelis and Palestinians to come together 
in peace they must first escape the vicious conflict cycle that 
is linked to a multitude of related factors. The previously 
outlined peace writ small approach, inspired by complexity 
science and dynamic systems, is merely a starting point to 
inspire new ways of thinking about the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Gradually applying such ideas may lead to small-scale 
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initiatives facilitating new ways of thinking, behaving, and 
interacting. Gradually, these new and more positive 
experiences can spread, generating an emergent foundation 
for peace that is capable of supporting larger scale initiatives. 
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